Cambodia “Scam Center” Crypto Fraud: Chinese National Sentenced After $36.9M Was Laundered via Bahamas Bank → USDT

tamir
Wed, 28 Jan 2026 13:00:13 +0000
Law Enforcement, United States, US DOJ, Jingliang Su, Tether, USDT

A U.S. court has sentenced Chinese national Jingliang Su to 46 months in prison for his role in laundering more than $36.9 million stolen from 174 American victims in a “digital asset investment” scam run from scam centers in Cambodia. The laundering trail, as described by U.S. authorities, ran through U.S. shell structures, a single Bahamas bank account, and a conversion step into Tether (USDT)—a familiar “cash-out rail” in global crypto fraud.

Key Points

Who / outcome: Chinese national Jingliang Su sentenced to 46 months; ordered to pay $26,867,242.44 in restitution.

Charge: Su pleaded guilty (June 2025) to conspiracy to operate an illegal money transmitting business.

Victims / scale: DOJ says 174 U.S. victims were identified; >$36.9M laundered.

Fraud pattern: unsolicited contact via social media / calls / texts / online dating, then fake “crypto trading” websites showing fake profits.

Critical rail: funds routed to Deltec Bank (Bahamas) and converted into USDT, then transferred to a Cambodia-controlled wallet and distributed onward.

Case context: DOJ previously described Axis Digital Limited as the name on the Bahamas account used to aggregate victim funds.

Short Narrative

This is not “just another crypto scam conviction.” It’s a clean example of how today’s transnational fraud stacks work: social engineering at the front end, fake platforms as theater, and a stablecoin conversion step as the operational bridge from the U.S. banking system to offshore scam infrastructure.

According to the DOJ, the conspiracy began with overseas co-conspirators approaching Americans through unsolicited messages and online dating services, building trust, and then pushing victims toward fraudulent digital-asset “investments” on websites designed to resemble legitimate trading platforms. Victims were shown fabricated gains—while their money was being stolen.

The cash-out rail described by prosecutors is the real story: more than $36.9 million was funneled into one account at Deltec Bank in the Bahamas, converted into Tether (USDT), and sent to a digital-asset wallet controlled in Cambodia, from where it was distributed to scam center leadership.

Extended Analysis

1) The “Scam Center” model is industrialized fraud

DOJ explicitly frames this conspiracy as being “carried out from scam centers in Cambodia.” That language matters: it points to organized, repeatable, scalable operations—where “customer acquisition” is manipulation, and “product delivery” is a fake dashboard showing unreal profits.

2) The rail map (as alleged by U.S. authorities)

If you want the anatomy in one chain, the DOJ’s description reads like a compliance flowchart:

Contact & grooming (social/text/dating) → Fake trading site → Victim transfers to controlled accounts → U.S. shell-company / bank layering → Aggregation at Deltec Bank (Bahamas) → Conversion to USDT → Cambodia wallet control → Distribution to scam center leaders.

This is exactly why FinTelegram keeps calling stablecoins a chokepoint: not because USDT “causes” fraud—but because it repeatedly appears at the conversion layer where victims’ fiat becomes portable, liquid, and internationally transferrable at speed.

3) Compliance questions that don’t go away

The DOJ states that co-conspirators “directed” a bank to convert victim funds to USDT and transfer the converted funds onward.

That raises blunt compliance questions that the market still refuses to answer out loud:

Banking controls: What red-flagging, enhanced due diligence, or transaction monitoring triggered—or failed to trigger—when tens of millions consolidated into a single offshore account and rapidly converted into stablecoins?

Account purpose & counterparties: Why was a single account allegedly used as a collection point for large volumes of victim proceeds—then routed to digital asset wallets controlled in Cambodia?

MSB licensing reality: Su pleaded guilty to conspiracy to operate an illegal money transmitting business—the exact legal seam where “we just move funds” becomes criminal exposure.

4) The enforcement signal: follow the launderers, not only the scammers

The DOJ emphasizes dismantling infrastructure, seizing crypto, and disrupting laundering networks as a strategy against scam-center operations. It also notes that CCIPS has secured 180+ cybercrime convictions since 2020 and court orders for return of $350M+ in victim funds.

That is the correct direction—because scam centers thrive when the conversion layer (shell companies, bank accounts, money-mule networks, stablecoin ramps) remains available and scalable.

Actionable Insight

For banks, EMI/PSPs, and crypto on/off-ramps: treat this DOJ case as a template for detection. Pattern-match on (i) large aggregation into one account, (ii) rapid conversion into stablecoins, (iii) transfers to wallets controlled from high-risk jurisdictions, and (iv) links to shell-company networks that exist primarily to relay funds.

For consumers and victims: unsolicited investment outreach—especially via social media or dating apps—paired with a “trading platform” that only shows profits is a classic fraud setup. DOJ points victims to report digital-asset investment fraud via IC3.

Call for Information

FinTelegram is tracking scam-center payment rails (stablecoin conversion steps, offshore bank accounts, shell-company layers, mule networks, and the service providers enabling them). If you have information about Axis Digital Limited, related accounts, wallets, intermediaries, or scam-center operators targeting Europeans or Americans, contact us via Whistle42.com. Anonymous submissions are welcome.