The Payvision Files: Exclusive Revelations on the CEO’s Complicity in Lenhoff and Barak’s Cybercrime Empire

tamir
Tue, 10 Feb 2026 13:25:13 +0000
Austria, Court Cases, Germany, Money Laundering, Netherlands, ticker, Gal Barak, ING, PayVision, Rudolf Booker, Uwe Lenhoff

It is one of the largest European cybercrime cases, with dozens of indictments and victim lawsuits. In its center - the Dutch payment facilitator Payvision. Fresh excerpts from criminal files obtained by FinTelegram put Payvision’s then-CEO Rudolf Booker uncomfortably close to the Lenhoff–Barak scam machine. These are not the fingerprints of a “neutral payment processor,” but the voice of an anxious, hands-on gatekeeper and facilitator.

It is one of the largest European cybercrime cases, with dozens of indictments and victim lawsuits. In its center – the Dutch payment facilitator Payvision. Fresh excerpts from criminal files obtained by FinTelegram put Payvision’s then-CEO Rudolf Booker uncomfortably close to the Lenhoff–Barak scam machine. These are not the fingerprints of a “neutral payment processor,” but the voice of an anxious, hands-on gatekeeper—tracking media risk, debating how to contain exposure, and negotiating the survival of a relationship that should have been shut down.

Key Points

A wiretapped call transcript shows Booker explicitly worrying what a FinTelegram reporter would “write about me now—about Payvision.” Lenhoff’s answer: “Maybe that you’re doing business on the grey market.”

In parallel Telegram evidence, Lenhoff tells Barak in December 2018: “Rudolf is a pussy… he will become very famous on this page (FinTelegram)… [They will] dig deeper in PV.”

These excerpts align with years of allegations that Payvision functioned as a critical payment “chokepoint” for the Barak/Lenhoff fraud ecosystem.

ING acquired a 75% stake in Payvision at a stated valuation of €360m and later announced a wind-down of Payvision’s PSP/acquiring services.

In April 2024, the Dutch prosecution service Openbaar Ministerie issued penalty orders (fines of €150k and €180k) against two former Payvision directors for long-standing, structural AML/CFT (Wwft) violations.

The central question remains: if the file excerpts show knowledge and operational entanglement, why is there still no public, courtroom-level accountability for the executive decision-makers?

The Lenhoff–Barak Cybercrime Network

German and Austrian law enforcement investigations established that German national Uwe Lenhoff and Israeli national Gal Barak ran a pan‑European cybercrime network of online trading, binary options, and gambling scams that defrauded tens of thousands of victims out of more than EUR 100 million.

Barak, identified as a principal of the E&G Bulgaria organization, was finally convicted in Vienna in 2020 for investment fraud and money laundering and sentenced to several years in prison, with courts confirming the criminal nature of the schemes operated via numerous online brands.

Lenhoff, who had been arrested after extensive investigations and EU‑wide coordination in January 2019, died in custody in Germany in 2020, with his death reported as sudden and unexplained, leaving many victims and open questions behind.

These criminal cases did not arise in a vacuum. They sat on top of a payment infrastructure that made high‑velocity fraud collection and laundering possible – and here Payvision and its founder and CEO Rudolf Booker enter center stage.

Read our Payvision reports here.

Payvision’s Role and the DNB Findings

Payvision, a Dutch card acquirer and payment processor founded and led by Rudolf Booker, positioned itself in high‑risk segments such as online gambling, forex, and similar verticals – sectors that law enforcement and regulators repeatedly associate with elevated fraud and money‑laundering risks.

In 2018, ING acquired a 75% stake in Payvision at a valuation of around €360 million, a transaction that turned Payvision’s high‑risk volume – including the Lenhoff–Barak flows – into a lucrative exit for its founders and managers.

The Dutch central bank (DNB) later issued a devastating supervisory investigation report on Payvision, describing systematic violations of the Dutch Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Act and serious, long‑running failings in customer due diligence and ongoing monitoring.

DNB’s findings make clear that Payvision continued to onboard and maintain high‑risk, fraud‑prone merchants despite glaring red flags, large volumes of suspicious transactions, and hundreds of internal alerts and suspicious activity indications; the watchdog found that Payvision effectively suspended or ignored its compliance obligations in pursuit of transaction volume.

According to DNB‑related reporting, the central bank even filed a criminal complaint in 2021 against Payvision and Rudolf Booker personally, and ING consequently decided to wind down Payvision and surrender its license by mid‑2023. For the founders, however, the damage was already monetized: ING’s purchase price rewarded years of high‑risk growth, including the revenues generated from the Lenhoff and Barak fraud schemes.

Under standard AML and criminal‑law doctrines in Europe, a financial institution (and its responsible managers) that knowingly provides payment rails to fraudulent organizations, in spite of red flags and supervisory warnings, risks liability as an aider and abettor to fraud and as a perpetrator of money‑laundering offenses

Analysis: A “Laundromat” for Scammers

Newly obtained wiretapped calls and digital communications paint a devastating picture of the relationship between Rudolf Booker, the founder and former CEO of Payvision, and the late Uwe Lenhoff. Far from a standard arm’s-length business relationship, the records show a close personal bond; Lenhoff even referred to Booker as his “friend” and hosted him at his luxury birthday celebrations.

The evidence suggests that Booker was not merely a negligent executive but a knowing facilitator of large-scale investment fraud:

Awareness of Fraud: Booker was fully aware that Lenhoff and Gal Barak (the “Wolf of Sofia”) were operating scam platforms like Option888 and XTraderFX. Despite hundreds of suspicious activity reports (SARs) and high chargeback rates from victims, Booker continued to provide the infrastructure necessary for these organizations to launder over €131 million.

Active Manipulation: When chargebacks—claims from defrauded victims trying to claw back their money—became too frequent, the “good friend” Booker reportedly suggested using false transaction codes and new legal entities to evade detection by credit card networks.

Profiting from Crime: Payvision didn’t just process the funds; it exploited the scammers. Booker reportedly imposed a sort of private “penalties” on the schemes of Lenhoff and Barak for chargebacks, effectively “ripping off the rippers” to inflate Payvision’s earnings ahead of its acquisition by ING.

The chats: “Rudolf is a pussy… he will become very famous on this page”

The WhatsApp from 25–26 December 2018 shows chat traffic between “UL” (Uwe Lenhoff) and “Gal” (Gal Barak).​ Shortly after a Payvision call informing Barak that his business was being shut down, Lenhoff writes that “one guy from Pay Vision tried to call me” and then delivers the key line: “Rudolf is a pussy and I told him that now he will become very famous on this page, cause when this WB [FinTelegram editor] is seeing that he is right, he will dig deeper in PV.”​

This message is explosive for several reasons:

It shows that Lenhoff understood FinTelegram (“this page”) as a leverage tool against Booker and Payvision, threatening that further reporting would uncover more wrongdoing at the processor (“dig deeper in PV”).​

It indicates that Booker was already “affected” by the reporting and was trying to pull back under pressure, prompting Lenhoff to retaliate by weaponizing his knowledge of Payvision’s conduct.​

It suggests an environment in which scam operators and their payment facilitator CEO were locked in a mutual‑blackmail dynamic, each aware of the other’s exposure; this is inconsistent with any portrayal of Payvision as a misled victim of sophisticated clients.​

In other words, the criminals themselves perceived Payvision’s CEO as someone who could be pressured for money or favorable treatment precisely because of the media and regulatory risks around his conduct.​

Legal Conclusion: Contributing Perpetrator

The findings of the Dutch Central Bank (DNB) confirm that Payvision’s compliance was systematically suspended or ignored. While two former directors were eventually issued penalty orders, the evidence suggests a more severe legal reality: Rudolf Booker knowingly and willingly supported a global cybercrime organization as a contributing perpetrator.

Booker enriched himself personally through the sale to ING—a transaction valued at €360 million based on volumes built largely on the backs of defrauded consumers. While Lenhoff died in prison and Barak was sentenced to years behind bars, Booker has largely escaped the full weight of criminal prosecution.

The ING Connection and Ongoing Lawsuits

ING eventually shuttered Payvision in 2021 after realizing the “dark business” was incompatible with any ethical or regulatory framework. However, the fallout continues. Victims, represented by organizations like EFRI, are still pursuing millions in damages through courts in Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands.

CALL FOR INSIDERS: WE NEED YOUR HELP

The investigation into the “Payvision Laundromat” is far from over. We are looking for additional information regarding:

Internal communications at Payvision or ING regarding the Lenhoff/Barak accounts.

Details on the “private penalties” and fees charged to scam operators.

Knowledge of deliberate compliance overrides directed by the board.

Help us hold those who profited from cybercrime accountable. Submit your information securely via our Whistle42 system. Your anonymity is our priority.